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Reflections on Judicial Merit
Selection, the Rhode Island
Experience, and Some Modest
Proposals for Reform and
Improvement*
Judge William E. Smith"

INTRODUCTION
The program "Judicial Merit Selection in Rhode Island:
Assessing the Fifteen Year Experience with Merit Selection" takes
a serious look at the Rhode Island merit selection process for
judges and asks a deceptively simple question: "Is it working?" By
creating a forum for this important discussion, Roger Williams
University School of Law is performing an important service for
the bench and bar. Professor Yelnosky should be complimented
for putting together an excellent program that includes solid
academic research, as well as commentary from the bar and
bench. In producing a program like this, the law school is
fulfilling one of the core missions envisioned at its founding:
providing a forum for, and acting as an honest broker of discussion
and debate for the improvement of the bench and bar in Rhode
Island. I am proud to be a member of the adjunct faculty of the
law school, and to be a part of this program.
My views about the judicial selection process are those of an
This essay is an expanded version of comments delivered at the Symposium
"Judicial Merit Selection in Rhode Island: Assessing the Fifteen Year
Experience with Merit Selection."
" District Judge, United States District Court, District of Rhode Island. The
author would like to thank Julie Moore, J.D., RWU School of Law (2010) for
her research assistance on this project.
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outsider looking in. By this I mean that I have never been a
candidate for state judicial office, nor have I been on the Judicial
I do, however, have a
Nominating Commission ("JNC").
perspective that I hope will have some value. It is a perspective
that is unique in some ways, and, because it is grounded in my
own life experiences my comments are, in part, a personal
reflection.
I have been a member of the Rhode Island bar for more than
twenty-two years. Thus, I have observed the selection process
both pre-JNC and post-JNC (and practiced under both as well).
For the past seven years, I have observed the work of the judiciary
and the selection process as a sitting U.S. District Court Judge.
Over these years, I have informally advised members of the JNC,
governors' staff members, judicial aspirants, and other interested
parties on various issues regarding judicial selection and the work
of the JNC. I have also been through two rigorous judicial
selection processes of my own, first for the federal district court
and then for the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
On the personal side, I witnessed the judicial selection process
up close and personal: my late father was an early advocate and
organizer of the judicial reform movement in Idaho in the late
1950s and early 1960s, and the first merit selection appointee in
the Idaho Judiciary after the enactment of the modified "Missouri
Plan" for judicial selection in 1969. And finally, as a member of
the faculty at Roger Williams University School of Law, I spend
considerable time studying and exploring with students the issue
of what judges do and how they do it, and discussing the future of
the law and judicial behavior.'
The goal of this essay is threefold: First, to provide some
commentary on the papers presented in this program and give
some decidedly unscientific views from my own experiences and
observations about the impact of merit selection on the Rhode

1. My course on Advanced Evidence deals primarily with the subject of
expert and scientific evidence, and explores cutting edge issues of science and
the impact these fields of study are having on the law and the courts. My
course on Judicial Process: How Judges Think, explores issues of how judges
make decisions, including traditional frameworks for judicial decision
making, the effects of intuition, deliberation (and other topics from the field
of modern cognitive psychology), collegiality and the writing process on the
judicial decision making process.
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Island judiciary. I will argue that while the empirical studies
presented at this conference do not support the conclusion that
merit selection has improved the quality of the judiciary, I believe
important strides have been made; that in the past fifteen to
twenty years, the Rhode Island judiciary has attracted numerous
exceptional attorneys and public servants to its ranks; and some
(but not all) of this progress can be attributed to merit selection.
Second, I will argue that the process for judicial selection is
inherently political in nature and selection of judges cannot and
should not be separated from its roots in the political process.
Third, with this premise in mind, I will attempt to address the
issue of what can be done to further improve the quality of the
judiciary and the process for selecting judges. In this regard, I
will suggest some structural and process reforms that might assist
in achieving the goal of creating and sustaining an exceptional
judiciary. But first, some personal history.
I.

MY JUDICIAL MENTOR

After serving in World War II, my father returned to his home
state of Idaho and attended law school at the University of Idaho
on the GI Bill. After working for a short time as a corporate inhouse counsel and in a solo practice, my father began his judicial
career as an elected probate judge in Boise, besting a seventysomething incumbent judge who had held the job for many years.
My father used palm cards in his first race in the 1950s that
touted him as young and energetic. When he ran for reelection in
the next cycle, the palm card appeared like this:
RE-ELECT

W. E. SMITH
Lawyer
REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE
FOR
ADA COUNTY

Probate Judge
Seasoned -

Responsible -

Capable -

W. E. Smith for Ado County Judge Commitee ...

Efficient

Bloine F. Evans, Chairman
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In just one short term he had become "seasoned" as well as
"responsible, capable and efficient"!
In those days, elections were partisan for the Probate Court
position and he ran as a Republican. After his appointment by the
Governor, in 1969, to the trial court of general jurisdiction, known
as the District Court in Idaho, he ran every four years for
reelection in non-partisan elections.
I remember as a child spending many fall days marching in
parades, passing out political pamphlets, and watching speeches
by my father to small community groups as he campaigned for
reelection. I only recall one contested election and his reelection
campaigns were always successful; but there nonetheless were
times of significant family stress because his job was effectively on
the line every election cycle. We all weathered these elections and
he enjoyed a long and distinguished judicial career as both a
Probate Court judge and trial court judge from 1960 until 1987,
when he retired.
I recall from a very young age hearing about "court reform." I
admit that the concept did not mean much to me in those days,
but I have since come to learn much more about what my father
meant when he spoke about court reform and merit selection of
judges as one of his most important achievements as a judge. In
1959 and 1960, my father chaired the "Inferior Courts Reform
Committee" and drafted a constitutional amendment known as
HJR 10,2 which was adopted in 1962 by the Idaho Legislature.3
HJR 10 was a proposal to amend the Idaho State Constitution to
create a unified court system,4 eliminating the constitutional
status of justice of the peace and police courts. 5 The book, Justice
for the Times: A Centennial History of the Idaho State Courts,
notes:
Continuing the bar efforts of previous decades, Judge
2. JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE IDAHO STATE
COURTS 159 (Carl Bianchi ed., 1990) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES].

3.

JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES, supra note 2, at 159. See Idaho Sec'y of State

Election

Div.,

http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/stcon/amendmts.htm

(last

visited Jan. 12, 2010) (noting that ratification took place in 1962).
4. See
generally
Idaho
Sec'y
of
State
Election
Div.,
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/hst60_70.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010)
(stating that the purpose of the amendment was to eliminate probate courts
as constitutional courts).
5. JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES, supra note 2, at 160.
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Smith's committee and other officers and members of the
Idaho State bar, enlisting the help of interested groups
and citizens at large, were responsible for the approval of
HJR 10 by the people on November 6, 1962. The passage
of this constitutional keystone, after past failures, may
have been the first clue that the ground was now fertile
for court restructuring.6
Implementation of changes to the system were slow in coming
in the 1960s after the passage of HJR 10, however, but eventually
the Idaho legislature enacted a set of proposals that emerged from
a series of citizens' conferences on the judiciary, which in turn had
been inspired by the work of the American Judicature Society in
South Dakota.7 Among the proposals enacted by the legislature
was a modified "Missouri Plan" for merit-based judicial selection. 8
(The modification allowed for merit selection for the initial
appointment of district judges and Supreme Court justices, but
retained nonpartisan elections after the initial appointed term.9 )
The package of bills approved by both the legislature and the
Governor (after an initial veto) included the restructuring of the
judicial districts in the state, created two new trial court
judgeships and established the Idaho Judicial Council ("IJC"), the
judicial selection panel under the new modified "Missouri Plan"
system for merit selection'o (the Idaho analogue to the Rhode
Island JNC). Upon its creation, the IJC's first order of business
was to recommend three candidates for each of the two newly
created District Court judgeships.11 My father, then still a
probate judge in Boise, having been one of the leading proponents
of court reform, and the drafter of the constitutional amendment
that allowed for it, was included on the list of three candidates
submitted to the Governor.12 He was selected by the Governor for
one of the open judgeships.13 So it was that my father became the
6. Id.
7. Id. at 164.
8. Id. at 165.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 167.
11. Id. at 170.
12. See id. at n.42.
13. Id. Our family history includes a story about an earlier opening on
the District Court for which my father had been a contender, and to which
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first judge in the Idaho judiciary selected pursuant to the merit
selection process. I remember like it was yesterday, being
summoned from my elementary school classroom in 1969 to walk
the three blocks from the school to the state capitol where he was
sworn in on the steps. He took office as a state District Court
judge exactly forty years ago. 14
Although I did not realize it until much later, my father was
not only a very important role model for me in life and the law, he
was in fact my earliest and most important mentor as a judge.
From my earliest childhood, I watched and learned from a good
judge doing the work he loved, and believed in so strongly, in a
highly ethical, workmanlike, intelligent and compassionate
manner. On countless days, after school, I would walk the three
blocks from St. Joseph's elementary school to the county
courthouse (which was next to the state capitol) in order to wait
for a ride home. I would occasionally sit in the courtroom and
watch trials or motion hearings or sentencings; or, I would plop
down in the big reclining chair in his office (part of the standard
issue equipment for trial judges in those days because juries often
deliberated long into the night). As I did homework, I would
watch my father work at his desk, surrounded by open volumes of
the Idaho State Reports, writing decisions in fountain pen on a
yellow legal pad just as I am penning this essay today. In the
evenings over dinner with my mother, my two older brothers and
younger sister, especially as we grew older, the discussion often
turned to the law.15 As my brothers and I entered "liberal"
the former Governor apparently promised an appointment. The story goes
that my uncle (my mother's brother), a prominent Boise physician, was
infuriated at the Governor, whom he had known since college, when he failed
to follow through with the appointment choosing someone else instead. My
uncle drove to the state capitol several blocks from his office to confront the
Governor. The Governor escaped from his office by running down a littleused back staircase and getting away in his car. It must have been quite a
scene! To my knowledge, though they both lived to their nineties, the two
never spoke again.
14. See generally JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES, supra note 2, at 170, n.2.
15. All four of us pursued legal careers:
The oldest, Steve, after
graduating from Georgetown, spent some time as a journalist before
returning to law school at Tulane and becoming a civil litigator. He now
practices in Boise a couple of blocks from the old county courthouse. Tom,
after Cornell and Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, went on to Yale Law School
and a career as a legal academic. And my sister, Trish, the only one of us to
attend the University of Idaho, went on to Georgetown Law and a career as
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"Eastern" colleges (much to my father's chagrin), the exchanges at
the holidays frequently became heated. But along with the
stimulation of these legal discussions were underlying themes of
devotion to public service, strict fidelity to the law, and living a
life according to the highest standards of ethical behavior. I will
never forget my father warning me that I must behave better than
other kids in school because my conduct was a reflection on him.
And while I must admit that I did not always heed this advice, I
avoided serious problems and the larger point he was making
stuck with me.
We are all the products of our life experiences. I believe in my
own case, being the son of an exceptional and devoted state trial
judge and public servant is probably the single most important
ingredient why I sought to become a judge, and in what kind of
judge I am today. No doubt my parochial lower school education,
Jesuit college and law school experiences, fifteen years as a
practicing attorney at a large sophisticated law firm, my own
lifelong involvement in, and enjoyment of politics, and other
important mentors, both lawyers and judges, were (and continue
to be) important influences too. But my sense of devotion to the
law, dedication to public service, and ethical behavior, which are
the cornerstones for a judge, were given to me by my father. And
for this I am forever grateful.
I tell this personal story of childhood experiences for several
reasons that relate to this commentary. First, while I did not
realize it at the time, my childhood experience planted a seed in
me - it allowed me to see myself as a judge, to believe I could do
the work well, and to develop the ambition to pursue it when the
opportunity arose. As I will explain more below, planting seeds
with talented young lawyers must be part of building a great
judiciary for the future. In my case it happened by chance of
birth; one of the challenges for the future is to move beyond
chance and institutionalize the cultivation of exceptional
candidates for the judiciary. Second, these experiences taught me,
from a very early age, that there is an inextricable connection
between politics, public service, and the judiciary. This connection
has always been a part of our system and it always will be. I
believe this fact is not something to lament, but rather a reality to
be both embraced and cultivated. And third, my father was a very
an Assistant District Attorney.
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good judge, but I do not mean to idolize him as if he were Learned
Hand or Oliver Wendell Holmes. He was neither, and neither am
I. So as I look at the Rhode Island state judiciary in the context of
merit selection, I view it through the prism of my father's and my
own judicial careers. Our Rhode Island judiciary is fundamentally
comprised of smart, hard working and ethical judges who are
getting the job done much like my father did during his twentyseven years of service. It is a judiciary that is substantially
improved from when I became a member of the bar in 1987.
II. CAN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TELL Us ANYTHING ABOUT THE
SUCCESS OF MERIT SELECTION?

The papers presented at this conference by Professor
Yelnosky,1 Mirya Holman, a Ph.D. candidate from Claremont
University and Research Associate at Duke University Law
School,1 7 and Professor Rachel Caufield, Associate Professor at
Drake University and a Research Fellow at the American
Judicature Society,18 attempt to evaluate whether the merit
selection process has improved the quality of the judiciary
utilizing empirical research methods.19 While I have some doubts
about the ultimate usefulness of empirical research in this
endeavor, I do think there are some constructive observations
contained in these papers. These observations, however, only
scratch the surface and do not consider information that could be
highly relevant to the inquiry. In sum, the studies are useful as
far as they go in their overall assessment; raise more questions

16. See Michael J. Yelnosky, The Impact of "Merit Selection" on the
Characteristicsof Rhode Island Judges, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 649
(2010).

17.

See Mirya R. Holman, Measuring Merit in Rhode Island's Natural

Experiment in Judicial Selection, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 705 (2010).

18. See Rachel Paine Caufield, What Makes Merit Selection Different?, 15
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 765 (2010).

19. A fourth paper by John Marion, Executive Director of Common
Cause, focuses more on the historic underpinnings of and perceived problems
with the Rhode Island merit selection system. See generally John Marion,

Judging How we Pick Judges: Fifteen Years of Merit Selection in Rhode
Island, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 735 (2010). I will provide no critique of
that paper in these pages, but will refer to some of his observations and
conclusions.
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than they answer; and leave plenty of room for further research
and debate.
In his paper, Professor Yelnosky compares the 1994, pre-merit
selection cohort of judges to a merit selection cohort. 20 He
concludes that under merit selection, fewer judges attended Rhode
Island undergraduate institutions and more attended Suffolk Law
School (37% vs. 28.8%).21 Professor Yelnosky notes specifically
that Boston University Law School educated 32% of the 1994
cohort, but only 14.8% of the merit selection judges. 2 2 He
contends that these changes may reveal a shift in quality because
Boston University is a more highly ranked law school than
Suffolk.23 Professor Yelnosky's concern, however, is not just about
quality - he also suggests this shift may represent greater
"homogen[ization]" of the judiciary, 2 4 although just what effect
"homogenization" has on the judiciary is difficult to know.
While it could be that the increase in the number of Suffolk
graduates represents a slight slippage in quality, 25 I would make
three counter points for consideration: First, the analysis contains
no examination of individual academic performance of the judges,
and law school itself is at best only a partial proxy. As both a
partner in a large law firm that hired numerous associates, and as
a judge who has hired law clerks from a wide variety of schools
(including Suffolk, Roger Williams, University of Connecticut,
Boston University, Boston College, University of Kansas, Notre
Dame, Northwestern University and Cornell, just to name a few),
I can attest that the top graduates from all of these law schools
are very closely matched in skill and ability. And, as Roger
Williams University School of Law knows so well, often financial
incentives are used to attract top performing students to attend
third or fourth tier law schools in lieu of more highly ranked
schools. Thus, a judge who was a top graduate at Suffolk would
not represent a lower quality data point as compared to a middle-

20. See generally Yelnosky, supra note 16.
21. Id. at 653-54.
22. Id. at 654.
23. See id. at 656-57.
24. Id. at 656.
25. Professor Caufield's paper appears to take the opposite view
regarding whether law schools attended can tell us anything about quality.
See generally Caufield, supranote 18.
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of-the-road graduate of Boston University (or Harvard for that
matter).
Second, it is not unusual that regional schools will draw
students who know they want to practice in the geographic area
served by that school. A majority of judges in Idaho were and are
educated at the University of Idaho, just like my father was in the
1940s and 50s. I am sure the same is true in many states with
strong regional schools. Students choose schools based on many
things, including affordability, local alumni contacts and
convenience (Suffolk has a night program, for example). So, the
increase in Suffolk graduates could be the result of many factors
unrelated to academic ability.
Finally, knowing so many of these judges, I cannot help but
believe that if a survey were taken of the bar rating intellectual
ability, work ethic, judicial temperament, etcetera, 2 6 Suffolk
graduates, on average, would rate just as high (or maybe higher)
than judges who attended other schools. (I will discuss below
several reform proposals that could make such surveys even more
valuable.)
Having said this, there may be good reason to worry about
whether we are attracting the best and brightest of the bar to
state judicial service. In building a quality judiciary, we should
seek judges with a variety of skills and backgrounds, and should
value diversity. Diversity in education and experience, in my
The federal court
view, makes for a stronger judiciary.
in detail elsewhere
I
describe
(which
nationally
both
experience,
in this essay) and locally, supports this view. In my court, the law
schools of the judges going back seventy years are as follows:

26. Aspen Publishers/Wolters Kluwer Law & Business produces a
publication that compiles information of this type about federal judges called
THE ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2010).
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Judge
Hartigan
Leahy
Day
Pettine
Selya
Boyle
Lagueux
Torres
Lisi
Smith

Dates of Service
1940-1951
1951-1953
1954-1985
1966-1982
1986- present
1977-1992
1986-present
1987-2006
1994-present
2002-present

Law School
Columbia
Georgetown
Harvard
Boston University
Harvard
Boston College
Harvard
Duke
Temple
2
Georgetown '

While the sample size may not be statistically significant, the
comparison with the state judiciary is striking. (It is noteworthy
too that both Judges Lagueux and Torres were Superior Court
judges before joining the federal bench.) It is worth asking, what
is the source of this "prestige gap"? Is it the nature of the work,
which may be considered more complex and challenging, at least
on the civil side? The salary, which is somewhat higher? Is the
political process (selection by the Senator(s) and/or President)
somehow more selective? Is the ABA process (discussed in more
detail below) a quality filter? Is it simply the fact that there are
fewer positions? Or, is it that federal court practice tends to
attract practitioners with a more academic/big-firm/sophisticated
practice orientation? I certainly do not have the answers to these
questions, but I expect some combination of these factors (and
probably others) is at play here. 2 7 The difference in the law
schools attended by state and federal judges is difficult to ignore
and may be worth further study.
Professor Yelnosky also notes a reduction in the percentage of
judges that have worked in state government (from 77% in 1994 to
55.6% under merit selection). 28 If this finding is meant to suggest
a decline in the political connectedness of judges, I am not sure it
does. For example, it does not appear that this analysis accounts
for judges who previously worked in city government or have
family connections in state government (this is Rhode Island after
all!). For example, on the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Justice

27. It may be interesting to explore as well the schools attended by
Federal Bar Association members as compared to the larger Rhode Island
Bar Association.
28. Yelnosky, supranote 16, at 655.
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Flaherty was Mayor of Warwick 2 9 and his brother is a long time
member of the General Assembly; 30 and Justice Robinson was a
member of the East Greenwich School Committee, 3 1 and his
father was a legendary Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner
of Education in the 1950s and 1960s.3 2 Further, Justice Goldberg
was not only an assistant attorney general, but a former town
solicitor 3 3 as was retired Chief Justice Williams. 34 I would expect
that if these kinds of experiences are factored in across the
judiciary, it would reveal that the judicial merit selection cohort
has just as much "experience" in government, and is just as
"political" in this sense, as the pre-merit selection cohort.
Professor Yelnosky also characterizes the reduction in
appointments from the ranks of the General Assembly (from 33%
to 20.4%) as the "most promising" finding in his study. 3 5 I would
question this conclusion for several reasons. First, as I note
above, the political experience of appointees may simply be more
varied now than before; the fact that judges did not serve in the
General Assembly or on its staff does not mean those judges are
less "political." Second, there is no objective basis in his analysis
upon which to compare the "quality" of judges who have served in
the General Assembly versus those who have not. Anecdotally, I
can confidently say that some of the best judges to have served in
Rhode Island judiciary also served in the General Assembly.
Former Chief Justice Weisberger 36 and current Chief Justice
Information,
Public
State,
of
Sec'y
Island
29. Rhode
http://www.sos.ri.gov/govdirectory/index.php?page=DetailJudge&rid=2259
(last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
30. Town of Warwick, State Government Officials Representing
Warwick, Rhode Island, http://www.warwickri.gov/ (follow link to City
Government, Elected Officials) (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
31. RI.gov, http://sos.ri.gov/govdirectory/index.php?page=DetailJudge
&rid=2261 (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
32.

RHODE ISLAND GOVERNMENT OWNER'S MANUAL 99, (Office of Secretary

of State A. Ralph Mollis, 2007-2008) (obtainable through the S. Ct. library).
33.

THE AMERICAN BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 2117 (Gina L. Pratton,

et al. eds., 2010).
34.

THE AMERICAN BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 2162 (Marie T. Finn et

al. eds., 2009).
35. Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 657.
36.

THE AMERICAN BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 2085 (Marie T. Finn et

al. eds.,1993-94) (stating that C.J.(ret.) Weisberger served in the General
Assembly from 1953 to 1956).
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Suttell 3 7 both come immediately to mind. Others, like Judge
Indeglia 38 and Judge Torres, 39 also served in the Assembly, before
appointment to the state bench. And exceptional judges (often
from the more prestigious schools) have served as Governors'
counsel (former Justice Robert Flanders and Judge Judith Savage
for example). 40
The sentiment expressed by Professor Yelnosky, however, is
understandable, and the paper presented by John Marion,
Executive Director of Common Cause, trumpets the case for "depoliticalization." 4 1 The indelible impression left by the scandals
involving former Chief Justices Bevilaqua and Thomas Fay and
former House Speaker and Court Administrator Matthew Smith,
the bribery case involving Judge Almeida, and the ethics inquiry
of Judge Fuyat of the Family Court are hard to forget. However, I
think it is too easy to blame political involvement as the culprit
and the elimination of politics as the cure. In all of these scandals
the core problem was character, not politics. So I must take issue
with Professor Yelnosky and Mr. Marion as to their goal of depoliticization of judicial selection. We will never completely
remove politics from judicial selection, nor should we try. Rather,
the better goal is to raise and maintain the quality of members
and staff of the General Assembly (and the Governors' office) who
may become judicial aspirants; elect governors who are ethical
and care about and understand the importance of the judiciary;
and, focus on quality filters at the JNC level that would again
make distinguished General Assembly service a positive
credential, not a scarlet letter.
The paper presented by Mirya Holman also contains a
number of interesting conclusions. 42 Holman examines the issue
of whether merit selection has made a difference by creating three
37. THE AMERICAN BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 2122 (Gina L. Pratton
et al. eds., 2010) (stating that C.J. Suttell served in the General Assembly
from 1983 to 1990).
38. Id. at 2118 (stating that Judge Indeglia served in the General
Assembly from 1984 to 1989).
39. Id. at 2123 (stating that Judge Torres served as a state
representative from 1975 to 1980).
40. THE AMERICAN BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 2217-18, 2224 (Marie T.
Finn et al. eds., 2004-2005).
41. See generally Marion, supra note 19.
42. See generally Holman, supra note 17.
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sample cohorts: one pre-merit selection; one a hybrid of merit and
non-merit selection judges; and one post-merit selection. 4 3
Holman concludes that merit selection has had no overall effect on
the "productivity" of the Rhode Island Supreme Court as
measured by the total number of opinions published in each
cohort.4 4 Moreover, her data confirms what many observers
would probably guess: that the most significant individual
"producers" on the court have been retired Chief Justice
Weisberger, 4 5 retired Justice Flanders and retired Chief Justice
Williams. 4 6 But does this "productivity" reflect higher overall
quality?
Holman's data does not tell us much about this
important question. Moreover, the data does suggest that Chief
Justice Weisberger, by measure of citations by out of state courts,
appears to be the most influential Justice to have sat on the Court
in modern times. 4 7 Justice Weisberger has enjoyed a national
reputation for decades and he has been, for many years, an
instructor at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada. 48 (In
fact, my father attended the College in 1968 and again several
years later, and Justice Weisberger was one of his instructors on
both occasions.)
Holman also notes that the average opinion length has
increased under merit selection and that this may be a sign of
improved performance. 49 She recognizes, however, that such a
conclusion would be highly speculative. 50 Length alone, as any
judge who has read hundreds of briefs knows, does not necessarily
Holman attempts to draw some
harbinger higher quality.
conclusions about "independence" of the various cohorts from data

43. Id.
44. Id. at 713-14.
45. Holman notes that Justice Weisberger's production of opinions
appears to dip in the middle cohort. Id. at 714. I would suggest this was due
to his assumption of the Chief Justice's duties after the resignation of Chief
Justice Fay.
46. Id. at 719.
47. Id. at 716.
48. The National Judicial College, http://www.judges.org/givingnews/
givingstory_0509.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (stating that C.J. (ret.)
Weisberger served on the NJC faculty from 1966-1999).
49. Holman, supra note 17, at 721.
50. Id. at 727.
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compiled on the number of dissents. 5 1 Holman relies on the work
of scholars such as Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner
that attempts to measure independence by calculating the ratio of
the number of times a judge dissents against a so-called copartisan (a judge of the same political party) to the number of
dissents against an opponent party judge. 52 Based on this
measure, Holman suggests the hybrid court cohort was the most
independent and the merit selection cohort the least
independent. 53 (In fairness, she notes that even the merit
selection cohort is highly independent compared to other state
supreme courts, citing the Choi, Gulati and Posner 2009
research.) 54
This analysis tells us very little of real value, however,
because it ignores the peculiar reality of Rhode Island politics and
the personal dynamics of the Court. First, as anyone who has
toiled in the Rhode Island political fields at all knows, the labels
Republican and Democrat mean little when it comes to how the
men and women of the Rhode Island Supreme Court view the
Republican justices may be liberal or conservative
issues.
depending on the issue; Democratic justices may be the opposite.
Consider the fairly recent case of Chambers v. Ormiston55 as a
case in point. This case considered the question of whether the
Rhode Island Family Court could consider a same sex marriage of
two persons lawfully married in another state for purposes of
granting a divorce. 56 The Court's majority said it could not. 5 7
Two of the three majority justices (Robinson and Flaherty) are
Democrats; the two dissenting Justices favoring recognition of the
gay marriage are Republicans (Suttell and Goldberg). Party label
in this case is virtually meaningless when it comes to assessing
the work (and independence) of the Court on what is clearly a hot
button social issue. More interesting it seems to me is the effect of
religious and social views and other potential influences, and the
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 725-26.
Id.
Id. at 726.

54. Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary,
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. (forthcoming)).
55. 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
56. Id. at 958.
57. Id.
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degree to which the judges are influenced by and/or able to check
such views. 58
The second factor that is not accounted for in Holman's
empirical analysis is what I will call the "Flanders effect." It is
well known that during his eight years on the court, former
Justice Flanders dissented frequently. 5 9 And because the court
included at least two other Republican justices during most of that
time, all of these dissents likely would be counted as indicators of
"independence." In reality, however, the high number of dissents
by Justice Flanders did little to make the Court "independent" in
any meaningful political or ideological sense. Rather, his dissents
emerged more from his strong views about the correctness of his
own opinions, and his unwillingness to accommodate other
justices' views. Holman recognizes this possibility and notes that
some scholars refer to this as "cantankerousness." 60 I do not
necessarily ascribe to that characterization - I only point out that
the data that drives her conclusion is a result of one
uncompromising justice expressing his strongly held views in
dissenting opinions. While this might show that this one justice
was quite "independent" in some sense, I do not think it tells us
much about the overall political independence of the Court, or
more importantly for our purposes here, about the effect of merit
selection on the independence of the Court. In the end, Holman's
study buttresses Professor Yelnosky's conclusion that none of
these empirical measures of judicial performance clearly point to
improvement as a result of the merit selection process.6 1
The paper presented by Professor Rachel Caufield seems to
confirm that no hard and fast conclusions can be drawn from the
available data that merit selection improves the quality of the

58. I am not suggesting the result in Chambers was dictated by religious
views; rather, this and other factors (including political backgrounds) that
may influence judicial decision making has been and continues to be fertile
ground for study. See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). This is a topic we
consider in my course on Judicial Process: How Judges Think.
59. See generally Westlaw.com, http://web2.westlaw.com (search of Rhode
Island case law reveals that Justice Flanders authored forty-nine dissents
during his tenure on the Court).
60. Holman, supra note 17, at 713.
61. See generally id.; Yelnosky, supranote 16.
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judiciary. 62 What she does conclude is that merit systems in
general produce a more diverse judiciary than either appointive or
elective systems 6 3 (although there are studies that reach the
opposite conclusion); and that appointive judges tend to be less
likely to be tied to the state by birth, and more likely to have been
educated at prestigious law schools. 6 4 Professor Caufield argues
that the result of gender and racial diversity is a positive effect,
but that diversity of background and prestigious law school
education is not as important. 6 5 So, while Professor Yelnosky
suggests that the school at which a judge received his or her law
school education might be an indicator of quality,6 6 Professor
Caufield seems to suggest it is of no consequence. 6 7 If nothing
else, this illustrates that there is no clear consensus on the most
effective methods of measuring the quality of judicial selections.
On the issue of productivity and influence, Caufield concludes
that elected judges seem to write more opinions, but in terms of
influence (as measured by citations by other courts) it is a mixed
bag - the leading courts use appointive, elective and merit
selection systems. 68
From all the data she examines, Professor Caufield jumps to a
conclusion that may not be supported by the data. She says that
while it is unclear which system produces the "best" judges, it is
clear that there are fewer ideological forces at work among merit
selection judges than those selected by election or appointment. 6 9
I agree that data she cites would indicate that elected judges are
more inclined to take positions that are popular with the public
(this, of course, makes sense); but I do not see support for this
conclusion in her data as it applies to appointed judges. Moreover,
the claim that merit selection judges are less subject to ideological
or political influences in their decision making is a sweeping (and
unsupported) conclusion that fails to consider the wide range of
factors at play in judicial decision making. What influences
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See generally Caufield, supra note 18.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 781, 784.
See Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 657.
See Caufield, supra note 18, at 781.
Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 784-86.
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judicial decision making is a field that has intrigued political and
social scientists for decades, 70 and one that is currently receiving
renewed attention from legal and social science academics. 7 1 It is
a complex and interesting field, and one to which I devote
substantial attention in my teaching.
There are so many
influences at work in the process of judicial decision making,
however, I question whether the data exists to support Professor
Caufield's broad conclusion that merit selection judges are less
prone to such influencing factors. 7 2 No question, however, the
issue deserves further study.
Professor Caufield's final conclusion that merit selection
systems seem to have resulted in more ethical judges by measure
of judicial discipline complaints 73 is the one point in all of these
papers with which I agree completely. And this arguably is the
single most important contribution the merit selection system has
made to the quality of the judiciary in Rhode Island.
My own assessment of the merit selection process in Rhode
Island is admittedly unscientific. As a practitioner and observer I
think the judiciary and the public generally have been well served
by the process. First, Rhode Island has not endured an ethical
scandal in the judiciary since the Fay/Smith debacle and the
Almeida conviction in the 1980s.
This alone is significant
progress. Moreover, in the 1980s there were trial judges in the
Superior Court that, to put it bluntly, were neither competent nor
ethical, by almost any measure. Some of my first experiences as
70.

See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY

(1964).
71. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997);
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, Stanford

University Press (2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, Harvard

University Press (2008).
72. The revival in the study of the "science" of judicial decision making
has attracted a number of scholars who attempted to utilize empirical
research methods in their work. These efforts yielded mixed results at best
in my view.

See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUDGES MAKE

(Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1998); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Harry T. Edwards & Michael Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting
Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009); Jeffery M. Chemerinsky
& Jonathan L. Williams, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173
(2009).
73. Caufield, supra note 18, at 789.
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an attorney in Rhode Island were before some of these judges, and
I frankly wondered what I had gotten into by moving here. I think
it is fair to say that those days are gone.
In addition, while not directly related to merit selection, the
reform of the Workers' Compensation Court and the restructuring
of the Traffic Tribunal, and its placement within the District
Court, have both markedly improved the judicial system in Rhode
Island. Improvements to the system, such as these, and the
selection of quality judges, require political leaders (governors and
General Assembly leaders) who make the courts a priority. Both
Governors Bruce Sundlun and Lincoln Almond took the
responsibility seriously and initiated (along with legislative and
judicial leaders) structural reforms to improve the system. Both
Governors also appointed a number of very well qualified judges
during their tenure under both the old system and the merit
selection system. Governor Carcieri has shown less interest in the
courts, but nevertheless has made some fine, if somewhat delayed,
selections. Merit selection then, in my view, has been one part of
a process of improvement of the Rhode Island judiciary that has
been ongoing for twenty years and continues to this day.
But even as the judiciary has seen improvement over these
years, there are reasons for concern. Merit selection only works if
the political leaders and their appointees allow it to work. Most
observers of the system probably would say that merit selection
has not lived up to the hopes and expectations that were placed on
it. Perhaps some of those expectations were too great. Or,
perhaps other factors (unrelated to the process) are responsible. It
is worth considering all possibilities, and John Marion's paper for
this conference covers many of these issues quite well.74
One of the most frequently heard criticisms of the process is
that it has pushed the politics below the surface and that the JNC
offers convenient political cover for the usual players who seek to
influence the system. Members of the JNC would deny that their
process is infiltrated by political influence. But, even if this is
true, some recent appointments would tend to support the
contention that political influences are present in the JNC process
and that the deal making of the past between the Governor and
General Assembly is still alive and well once candidates emerge
out of the JNC process.
74. See generally Marion, supra note 19.
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Adding to this perception are the various process distortions
of recent years: JNC members serving long past their terms;
candidate lists that live on for five years after the opening for
which they are created under the so-called "look-back"
provisions; 7 5 and the long delays in filling vacancies by the
Governor, who has deemed the statutory time lines "advisory."76
Moreover, as Mr. Marion points out, the most egregious
emasculation of the judicial selection process is the creation and
expansion of duties for magistrate judges. 7 7 Mr. Marion notes
there are currently twenty-one magistrates in the various courts
and more were proposed (but rejected) for the Traffic Tribunal. 7 8
The attorneys selected for magistrate positions have more
demonstrable connections to the General Assembly and, as he
notes, this indicates a creeping political infiltration of the
judiciary. 79
There have also been some low points in the confirmation
The
process in which political influences trumped merit.
legislative ambush of Margaret Curran, 80 a highly qualified
nominee to the Supreme Court, was clearly the most egregious
example since the adoption of merit selection. In the Curran case,
the General Assembly sought to teach the Governor a lesson about
No lesson was taught;
power sharing in judicial selection.
Governor Almond proceeded to nominate judges as he saw fit, and
the judiciary was deprived of someone who would have been an
excellent judge. Having endured my own legislative slap down
(both of Rhode Island's Senators "blue slipped" 8 1 my nomination to
75. R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-16.1-6(a)(4) (2010) (to be repealed effective Jun.
30, 2010).

76. Edward Fitzpatrick, Nominations to Bench Come at End of Session,
at
2008,
at
B2,
available
J.,
June
24,

PROVIDENCE

http://www.projo.com/news/content/judicial-roundup06-24-08_3NAK5IT_v
43.3e80772.html#.
77. Marion, supra note 19, at 748-49.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 749.

80. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Cool Wind, Cold Reception Mark Nomination,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 26, 1997, at Al5.

81. See Brannon P. Denning, The "Blue Slip" Enforcing the Norms of the
Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001), for a
detailed history regarding and explanation of the "blue slip" process. After "a
judicial nomination is made, the chair of the Judicial Committee sends 'blue
slips' (so called because of the color of paper used) to the senators of the

684 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:664
the First Circuit82) I can say from experience that these political
power plays go with the territory, and you have to be willing to
roll with the punches in this business. But the manner in which
the Curran nomination was handled by the General Assembly was
outrageous and marked the lowest ebb in the fifteen-year history
of the merit selection system.
The perceptions created by these events, regardless of how
accurate they may be, have two negative consequences that
cannot be ignored. First, and most regrettably, they tend to
undermine the public's confidence in the quality and integrity of
the judicial selection process; and second, they discourage highly
qualified attorneys from applying. My own review of the list of
applicants over the fifteen years of merit selection leads me to
believe that the pool of candidates has declined in both the
number and the quality of applicants in recent years. This of
course is just one observer's highly subjective and unscientific
impression, but I am confident that others who have carefully
followed these things over the years would agree with this view.
(Having said this, the group of five applicants selected by the JNC
for the opening on the Supreme Court, recently filled by Justice
Indeglia, was a very highly talented and academically
credentialed group, which is very encouraging.)
One of the goals of this fifteen-year retrospective is to
think about changes to the system that could improve the quality
of the judiciary. I will now turn to this subject, but first will
reiterate two principles that inform my views: First, as I stated
above, politics, public service and the judiciary are inextricably
intertwined and they always will be. It is a fool's errand to try to
change this fact; rather, the goal should be to work with and
Second, improving the quality of our
manage this reality.
judiciary should be viewed as a long-term process: there is no
simple fix. Fostering improvement requires looking at the system
nominee's home state. If even one senator declines to return the slip, then
the nomination is dead in the water, or further action will be extremely
difficult, depending on which practice the committee chair decides to follow."
Id. at 76.
82. And while less of a public spectacle than the Curran case, my case
involved ludicrous public and private justifications and accusations from
Rhode Island Senators to the effect that I was a "stalking horse for Bush
ideology," a member of the Federalist Society and a hand maiden of Vice
President Cheney. See, e.g., Whitehouse Voices Concerns Over Bush's
Judicial Nominee, Providence J., (Dec. 17, 2007).
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as a whole, with all of its complexity and nuances. It involves
structural reform of the judiciary itself (such as we saw with the
Worker's Compensation Court and Traffic Tribunal) and process
reform in judicial selection; and it requires making the courts and
the judiciary a priority of our two elected branches. With these
principles in mind, I will shortly recommend for consideration
several possible structural and process reforms that could help
improve the judiciary over the long term. Some of my suggestions
may be counter-intuitive, and perhaps controversial, but I believe
they (and others) deserve serious consideration.
III. THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL

Before I outline proposals for structural and process reforms,
let me describe briefly the judicial selection process on the federal
side, using my own direct experience as an example. I will argue
that there are lessons for the Rhode Island merit selection process
that can be learned from the federal system.
The first step in the judicial selection process for the District
Court is receiving the endorsement from the U.S. Senator of the
President's political party (or, if there is no Senator, the highest
elected office in the state of the President's party).83 In my case,
the Senator was someone whom I had served as legal counsel and
staff director over a combined period of eight years. Even with
that background however, there was a competitive process of
interviews and evaluations of a number of contenders. The list of
aspirants was kept close to the vest, but I know there were several
Senators have many different
highly qualified contenders.
methods of selecting candidates, and some are more inclined
toward political involvement than others; some use selection
committees; and some rely on trusted advisors. 84 Whatever the

83. See Rachel Brand, Judicial Appointments: Checks and Balances in
Practice, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (2010); see generally U.S. Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2010)
(stating that nominees' names are frequently recommended by Senators who
belong to the President's political party).
84. Professor Caufield has outlined some of these procedures in her
presentation, and argues that the federal system is moving in the direction of
merit selection by the adoption of these committees by Senators. See
generally Caufield, supra note 18. There may be some trend in this direction,
but my own view is that the process continues to have a decidedly political
flavor.
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initial process, after receiving the endorsement of the Senator, the
name is provided to the White House. Presidents have taken
Some
different approaches to this process over the years.
Presidents have required three names for each position in order to
preserve the Constitutional prerogative that "the President shall
nominate"; others have required only one name; in some
administrations
Senators' views have been given less
consideration with respect to court of appeals nominees than
district court nominees. 85 After the White House settles on a
prospective nominee, usually the individual recommended by the
Senator, what follows is an extensive series of background
investigations by the FBI, the White House Counsel's Office and
the Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy (OLP).86 These
investigations require answering detailed questionnaires, and in
my case, a substantial interview at the White House with the
Deputy Counsel and several Justice Department attorneys. Once
nominated, the Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire is
filled out and submitted to the Senate Committee. The Senate
It seeks
questionnaire is very detailed and comprehensive.
extensive information regarding the candidate's legal practice;
cases litigated; opposing counsel; judges before whom the
candidate has appeared; community involvement and other
matters. The American Bar Association (ABA) review process
picks up with the Senate questionnaire. 8 7 This independent
evaluation 8 8 begins with a personal interview by the evaluator,
85. See Brand, supra note 83, at 48 (noting that in an attempt to achieve
balance "between senators' wishes and the President's constitutional
prerogatives, President George W. Bush asked home-state senators to
recommend at least three names for each district court vacancy[,]" and that
"[r]ecent presidents have tended to be less deferential to home-state senators'
wishes regarding circuit court nominations.").
http://www.america.gov/st/usgAmerica.gov,
generally
86. See
english/2008/May/20080522224217eaifas0.5669672.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2010) (stating that the Department of Justice subjects each judicial nominee
to rigorous scrutiny).
87.
is

See AM. BAR Ass'N,,STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, WHAT IT
at
available
WORKS,
IT
AND
How

detailed
for
a
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/federaljudiciary09.pdf
explanation of the Committee's rating process.
88. During the Bush administration, the ABA process began after
nomination. See Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary,
Frequently Asked Questions on the Federal Judiciary (Mar. 2009),
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/home.html. It has now been moved back to
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who is typically the Circuit Representative on the ABA's Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary. He or she is usually a highly
regarded practitioner from another jurisdiction within the Circuit.
He asks detailed questions about practice, cases litigated, etc., and
requests samples of the nominee's writing. From there the
investigator conducts interviews of members of the bar, judges
and community leaders. If there are criticisms or concerns, the
nominee is given an opportunity to respond. The investigator
then submits a confidential report to the Standing Committee,
which then votes on a rating. The Committee has three ratings:
"well qualified"; "qualified"; and "unqualified".8 9
I received a rating of "qualified" for the district court from the
Committee. This is the rating I expected given the nature of my
practice primarily as a labor and employment attorney without a
great deal of federal court experience, but a very good academic
record, a sophisticated practice, and good reviews from lawyers,
judges and arbitrators. The process for my nomination to the
Court of Appeals was similar, except it was the President that
selected me for nomination, without senatorial endorsement
(which no doubt explains why I was never given a confirmation
hearing). Importantly, for our purposes here, the White House
and the ABA once again conducted a substantial review. This
time the Committee had well over one hundred published opinions
to review and many lawyers and judges to interview regarding my
qualifications. The result of the ABA Committee review was a
rating of "well qualified" for the circuit court.
I review this process here in some detail because I think it
represents the great strength of the selection/evaluation process in
the federal court system. There is no doubt that the process has a
political dimension - every federal judge has a story about how he
or she got to the position. But, there is also an extensive
evaluation of qualifications that acts as a quality control check on
the political process. Between the White House, Department of
Justice, Senate and ABA, there are virtually no rocks left
unturned. And, of these, the ABA review is potentially the most

White House pre-nomination evaluation under the Obama administration.

Id.
89. See Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary,
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
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non-partisan, and the most comprehensive with respect to
qualifications for the position.90
The federal court selection process contains multiple potential
check points for quality. For example, if a Senator pushes a
candidate who clearly is not qualified, the White House and the
Department of Justice investigative process can reveal the
problems and the President can refuse to nominate the candidate;
if the White House pushes a candidate who is not qualified, the
Senate can stand in the way. Both of these checks, however,
require the political courage of an office holder to stand up for the
principal of quality over politics or "political correctness." If either
the President or the Senate is unwilling to muster the courage to
do so, of course, these checks will not work. This concern is
perhaps most acute when the same party controls the White
House, the Senate and the Senators from the state where the seat
is located, and where the party in control enjoys a filibuster proof
majority. (This of course has been the current state of affairs, at
least until the recent election of Scott Brown to the Seat formerly

90. The ABA process is likely not completely a-political, and there is a
history of criticism of the Committee as liberal dominated. One oft-cited
example is the recommendation of "not qualified" of Judge Richard Posner of
the Seventh Circuit in the 1980s. See White House Brings ABA Back Inside
Judicial Nominations Process, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/03/
obama-brings-aba-back-inside-judicial-nominations-process.html (last visited
May 20, 2010). However, it was my impression in both of my nominations
that the evaluation by the First Circuit investigator was very objective and
not at all political; my sense is that to the extent political considerations (or
pressure) enter the system it may be through the Committee voting process.
Because that process is confidential, this is difficult to evaluate. My own
view is that the Committee as a whole probably leans to the liberal side of the
spectrum - that is, more critical of conservative presidential nominees, such
as Judge Posner, and more forgiving of liberal presidential nominees. The
recent investigation and rating of Judge 0. Rogeriee Thompson, nominee for
the First Circuit who received a "majority qualified/minority unqualified"
Judge Thompson was given two
rating, may be a case in point.
investigations, by separate investigators within the Circuit. According to the
Standing Committee's rules, this only occurs if the first review indicates that
a rating of unqualified is likely. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING
COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 6 (2009),

It
available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/federaljudiciary09.pdf.
appears that somewhere in this process the Committee as a whole landed on
the majority qualified/minority unqualified rating. Unfortunately, it is not
apparent whether this change resulted from sincere reconsideration of her
qualifications or from political influence exerted by the White House or
interest groups.
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held by Senator Edward Kennedy.) In all cases, and particularly
where one party is in total control, the ABA can and must act as
an honest broker, an objective evaluator of a candidate's
qualifications. Of course, the ABA's role is only advisory: to the
Senate during the Bush Administration; to the White House and
the Senate in the Obama administration.91 So in the end, the
process ultimately depends on the integrity of the ABA process,
and the willingness of both branches, 92 or at least one, to give the
ABA's views serious consideration.
The value of the ABA's carefully calibrated process - if it is
utilized as intended, and not politically manipulated - is that it

91. Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary, Frequently
Asked
Questions
on
the
Federal
Judiciary
(Mar.
2009),
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/fjcfaq.pdf.
92. Democrats in the Senate excoriated the Bush administration for
expelling the ABA from the White House Nomination process. See e.g.
Judicial Nominations Hearing (Feb. 25, 2004) (statement of Senator Patrick
Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.). Now the Obama
administration has reinstated it. See Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on the
Fed. Judiciary, Frequently Asked Questions on the Federal Judiciary (Mar.
2009), http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/fjcfaq.pdf. It is probably too early to
tell whether either the administration or the Senate will give serious
consideration to the ABA Standing Committee's evaluation now that the
Democrats appear to have near complete control of the judicial selection
process. There are indications, however, that they will not. See, for example,
Support for R.I. Judge not Unanimous, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 25, 2009, in
which Senators Jack Reed and Sheldon Whitehouse issued a joint statement
saying that "[t]he ABA plays a limited advisory role, and has nowhere near
the familiarity with judicial candidates that we do in Rhode Island." More
recently (as this essay was going to print), Senator Reed commented "as I
look closer at this whole process[,] . . . I've had serious questions about
whether [the ABA review process is] an effective way to rate a judge." John
E. Mulligan, Senate Panel to Vote on Rhode Islander Nominated to Federal
Bench, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 21, 2010. Moreover, Senator Whitehouse, for his
own part, speculated that the ABA process was weighted toward a "big-firm,
corporate law" view of judges and does not value other kinds of service. Id.
These are disturbing statements.
They demonstrate a willingness to
disregard and even denigrate the most thorough and independent evaluation
of qualifications for the position if it results in a rating not to the Senators' or
President's liking. Given the enormous amount of work that goes into the
ABA evaluative process, literally dozens of comprehensive interviews of
attorneys, judges and community leaders, reading thousands of pages of
decisions or briefs (if such exist) and lengthy, probing interviews of the
candidate, this casual dismissal of the ABA's review is at best distressing,
and at worst insulting to the reviewers and to those in the legal community
that participate in the review process.

690 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:664
can potentially prevent the nomination or confirmation of an
unqualified candidate and actually increase the likelihood that
highly qualified (as opposed to minimally or barely qualified)
candidates will obtain these positions. If the White House or a
Senator believes a marginal candidate, who may be a political
friend, or have a political angle on the job, would not secure a
"well qualified" or "qualified" rating, he or she could be dissuaded
from further pursuing the position, or turned down with adequate
political "cover." Moreover, the system also acts to increase the
That is, more
quality of candidates through self-selection.
marginal candidates are discouraged from applying because they
will not want to endure a process that may result in a low rating;
and more highly qualified candidates are encouraged to apply
because the system appears to value quality as well as politics.
The thoroughness of the federal process, while not perfect and
no doubt subject to manipulation, has much to teach us in
considering possible reforms to the system of merit selection of
judges in Rhode Island. I believe it could be possible to create a
system, within the current structure of the JNC, that would
mirror the best attributes of the federal system, including an
ABA-like evaluation process. 9 3 Such a system would not remove
politics from the process, but could serve to increase the quality
control checks on political influences, and, in turn, increase the
quality of the applicant pool for vacancies.

93. Pennsylvania, Washington and Ohio, for example, each have a rating
system. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States,
In Pennsylvania, a judicial evaluation
http://www.judicialselection.us/.
commission "rates appellate judicial candidates standing for retention as
either 'highly recommended,' 'recommended,' or 'not recommended."' Id. In
addition, the Judicial Evaluation Commission reviews investigative reports
on each candidate, interviews each candidate and rates each candidate for
appellate judicial office. Id. Ratings are made public via news releases and
the state bar association's website. Id. In Washington, the King County Bar
Association has a Judicial Screening Committee that rates candidates for
"appointment or election to the County Municipal, District and Superior
Courts and to state appellate courts for contested elections." Id. In Ohio, the
Columbus Bar Association rates candidates for contested judicial positions in
Id. The bar there bases its rating of "'highly
Franklin County.
recommended,' 'acceptable,' or 'not recommended,"' on candidates' interviews
and written responses to questions. Id.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY
AND JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS IN RHODE ISLAND

Could we make the Rhode Island judiciary better than it is
now (which is better than it was twenty years ago) by enacting
changes to the structure of the judiciary andlor by modifying the
selection process of the JNC? I believe the answer is yes. And if
we think about this as a long-term process - that is, we strive to
make changes that will allow us, twenty years from now, to look
back and say that these changes really did improve the quality of
the judiciary - rather than thinking of only short term fixes to
immediate problems, we will have a better chance of success.
While the ideas that follow are just a few of my own thoughts,
they primarily are meant to be discussion starters. 9 4 Others no
doubt will have different and better ideas.
A. Structural Reform Requiring Legislative Changes
For starters, I am advocating that the Governor propose, and
the General Assembly enact, legislation to create a formal review
commission to evaluate suggestions and make recommendations
for the reform and improvement of the judicial branch and of the
judicial selection process. The committee should be given one year
to issue a report with recommendations for changes and draft
legislation to implement those changes. What follows are several
suggestions for consideration by the proposed Review Commission.
1. Raise Judicial Pay Incrementally at the Superior Court and
Supreme Court Levels.
While many citizens believe judicial salaries are high enough
already, a National Center for State Courts survey shows that as
of June 2009, Rhode Island ranked fifteenth in judicial pay of
general trial court judges and nineteenth in pay of Supreme Court
justices. 95 It seems clear that higher pay yields a higher caliber of
applicants for the positions. 96 The higher pay for federal judges
94. Unless otherwise stated, I propose all of these changes as prospective
changes to apply to new judgeships as openings occur.
95. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES

(2009), availableat http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISO
ROOT-/judicial&CIS0PTR=288.
96. See Judicial Security and Independence, Hearing Before the U.S.
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attracts state trial court judges and Supreme Court justices to
leave for these positions. We have seen this locally (Judges Torres
and Lagueux), and I am familiar with numerous cases in other
states where judges have moved from state supreme courts and
trial courts to federal district courts and even magistrate and
bankruptcy judgeships. 97
Moreover, one of the disincentives faced by successful
attorneys who would make excellent judges is the pay cut required
to take the job. I have had many conversations with outstanding
attorneys encouraging them to consider applying for either state
or federal judgeship openings. Invariably I get two responses: "I
don't have any political connections" and "I can't take the pay cut."
The pay problem is more acute now than ever before for at least
two reasons. First, the gap between high earning attorneys and
judges has grown dramatically over the past forty years 9 8 and
college tuition costs have increased over one hundred percent over
the same period. 99 Since most lawyers attempt to make the move
to the judiciary in their mid-forties to mid-fifties, college expenses
are a major concern. Moreover, the federal courts have suffered a
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (2007) (statement of Associate Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy) (stating that low salaries of federal judges posed two
primary dangers: (1) "some of the most talented attorneys cannot be
persuaded to come to the [federal] bench"; and (2) "some of our most talented
and experienced judges are electing to leave it.")
97. It is also true, however, that in the 1990s both federal Magistrate
Judges Lovegreen and Martin applied for state court vacancies. Application
to Judicial Nominating Commission (on file with JNC). The pay was likely
more comparable and other factors (such as the attractiveness of a lifetime
appointment) may have been considerations.
98. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR AsS'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY
EROSION: A REPORT ON THE NEED FOR REFORM (2001). In 2001, partners at

major law firms typically received annual compensation over $500,000 while
the annual salary of federal district court judges was $145,100. Id. at 13, 19.
Justice Anthony Kennedy testified in 2007 that "[b]etween 1969 and 2006,
the real pay of district judges declined by about twenty-five percent," while
"[d]uring the same period, the real pay of the average American worker
increased by eighteen percent." Judicial Security and Independence, Hearing
Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (2007) (statement of Associate
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy). See also AM. BAR AsS'N & FED. BAR Ass'N,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION 11 (2001) (noting that from 1969 to 1999, pay

for private workers increased 420.6%, while pay for district judges increased
253.1%).
99. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR AsS'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION 9

(2001) (stating that the cost of a college education increased 111.3% from
1969 to 1999).
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number of recent resignations for pay reasons1 0 0 and there is a
concerted ongoing push to increase federal judges' pay as well. 10 1
I do not argue for a commensurate pay increase for the other
courts because the specialized nature of family and workers'
compensation courts will draw from a bar that makes somewhat
less on average in income, so the parity between private practice
and the court is likely to be closer. The same is likely true of the
district court and the attorneys who comprise the applicant pool
for these slots. (I admit, however, that I have not done any
research to test this hypothesis, so if it turns out to be incorrect
then appropriate adjustments should be made as called for.)
Moreover, by limiting increases to Superior and Supreme Courts,
the budget impact could be minimized.

100. In 2007, Utah federal judge Paul Cassell left the bench to rejoin
academia, citing concerns over judicial pay as a factor in his decision. Peter
Lattman, Judge Paul Cassell Resigns, Bemoaning Low Judicial Pay, WALL
available
at
BLOG,
Sept.
21,
2007,
ST.
J.
LAw
In 2006,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/21/judge-paul-cassell-resigning/.
Judge Michael Lutting resigned from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit to take a position at Boeing. Like Casell, Lutting cited money
as a factor in his decision to resign, stating that his two children were
nearing college age. David Stout, Judge Who Was Considered for Highest
available at
TIMES,
May
10,
2006,
Court Resigns, N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/washington/ll1uttigcnd.html?ex=130491
3600&en=dc3d28dddadb7af8&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss.
More recently, Judge Stephen Larson resigned from the federal judiciary,
also citing concerns regarding judicial compensation and his ability to
continue to support his family. Ashby Jones, With Larson's Resignation,
Judicial Pay Back in the News, WALL ST. J. LAw BLOG, Sept. 17, 2009,
available at http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/law/2009/09/17/with-larsons-resignationjudicial-pay-backinthenews/?utm-source-feedburner&utmmedium=feed
&utm campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Flaw%2Ffeed+%28WSJ.com%3A+Law+Bl
og%29.
101. See, e.g., Judicial Security and Independence, Hearing Before the U.S.
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (2007) (statement of Associate Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy).
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2. Consider Fixed Renewable Terms for Judgeships and
Incorporate the Magistrate Judgeships into the Merit Selection
Process. 102
Rhode Island is the only state that provides lifetime
appointments for all judicial officers (except Traffic Court
judges).1 03 Lifetime appointments have real benefits in terms of
preserving judicial independence and avoiding the unseemliness
and sometimes perverse results of judicial elections. In the
federal system, Article III judges, who are those appointed to the
court of appeals and the district court, enjoy lifetime tenure.1 0 4
However, there are numerous judges in the federal judicial system
who do not have lifetime tenure. Federal magistrate judges serve
eight-year renewable terms; 10 5 federal bankruptcy judges serve
fourteen-year renewable terms;1 0 6 numerous Article I (Executive
Branch) judges, such as immigration judges and administrative
law judges, are hired for specific terms. 10 7 These are very
important and responsible positions where the judges, in some
cases, are doing work equivalent to that of an Article III judge.
This model works because the positions work below the Article III
level, so the need for the independence provided by lifetime tenure
is not present.
Nevertheless, these positions can be, and
frequently are, career positions because renewal is the norm for a
well performing judge. (For example, Judge Arthur Votolato in
Rhode Island is the longest serving bankruptcy judge in the
102. See generally Katie Mulvaney, Selection of Magistrates Overhaul
Sought, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A5 (discussing bill sponsored by
Rep. Donna Walsh that would incorporate magistrate judges into the merit
selection process).
103. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States,
Methods
of
Judicial
Selection,
available
at
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/selectionIofjudges
.cfm?state. Some states, such as Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
provide appointment to a specific age, typically 70. Id.
104. Federal Judicial Center, How the Federal Courts Are Organized:
Federal
Judges
and
How
They
Get
Appointed,
http://www.fjc.gov/federallcourts.nsflautoframe!openform&nav-menu1&page
=/federal/courts.nsf/page/183 (last visited May 24, 2010).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Courts Outside the Judicial
Branch,
http://www.fj.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courtsspecial-fcotj.html
(last visited May 24, 2010).
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United States, having served in that position for over forty
years.108 ) The model of fixed renewable terms could be adopted
for the Rhode Island judiciary at all levels below the Supreme
Court. This proposal would not only increase the quality of
applicants at the outset, but would ensure ongoing quality
performance, an issue that the current system does not address at
all. Fixed terms also would provide some predictability about
when judgeships may open up, which in turn might allow
attorneys thinking about potentially applying to plan accordingly.
An attorney who may be in his mid- to late-fifties could see the
opportunity of a ten-year stint as a trial judge as a very nice way
to finish his career and use his experience for the betterment of
the system. 10 9
The proposal has merit as well because lifetime tenure is not
required to ensure independence for any of the lower courts. I
would, however, keep lifetime tenure for the Supreme Court for
two reasons. First, as the court of last resort, it is important to
preserve maximum independence. Second, given the proposal
below to make the Court the re-appointing authority for judges
seeking to renew their terms, the Court should be insulated from
any outside pressure from the other branches.
The fixed term proposal also allows for an enhanced role for
the JNC.
The JNC could be charged with conducting a
performance review and analysis of judges beginning one year
prior to the renewal date. The JNC could be given the task of
issuing a recommendation of "renew" or "not renew" to the
reappointing authority, which, I would argue, should be the
Supreme Court. Combining this process with a system of ongoing
performance evaluation, similar to what is done at the federal
level, would allow the reappointing authority to urge non-highly
performing judges to consider not reapplying. In this respect the
JNC would also act as a counter force or check on any possible
bias based on personal animosity or political views by the
Supreme Court against a judge up for renewal.
Finally,
renewable terms would act as a check against those whose

108. See David McPherson, Judge Expects Bankruptcy Filings to Pile Up,
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 20, 2005, at Fl.

109. This proposal could also have the effect of increasing the age and the
experience of applicants, and decreasing the pension costs for judges.
However, this proposition requires further research.
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performance becomes poor because of laziness, boredom or
otherwise. Knowing that performance is being reviewed on an
ongoing basis, and formally at renewal, will incentivize better
performance.
3. Establish Intermediate Appellate Panels.
This proposal is modeled on the Bankruptcy Appeal Panels
(BAP) in the federal system and the workers' compensation court
appeals panels in the Rhode Island Worker's Compensation Court.
Appeal panels could be composed of two superior court judges and
one judge from either the Family or Worker's Compensation
Court. The panels could hear cases diverted by the Supreme
Court, and appeals could be taken by certiorari to the Supreme
Court. This proposal would have several benefits at virtually no
cost. First, it could broaden the experience of participating Family
and Worker's Compensation Court judges, which could make them
more attractive candidates for the Superior or Supreme Courts.
Further, because eighty percent of appeals to the Supreme Court
currently come from the Superior Court, applicants to the
Supreme Court from the Family and Workers' Compensation
Courts are at an experience disadvantage. There could be some
very qualified judges on these courts who would make fine
Supreme Court justices if given the opportunity to broaden their
skills and experience. Second, it would allow participating judges
to develop and broaden their writing skills, which in turn would
improve analytic skills and serve as a platform to showcase
abilities that might not otherwise be allowed to shine.11 0 Third,
these panels would lighten the load of the Supreme Court allowing
for more time for Supreme Court justices to write on the more
complicated cases that come before them. Finally, the overall
production of opinions between the Supreme Court and the
intermediate appellate panels would be greater than what the
Supreme Court currently produces, allowing for more
development of the common law. These appellate panels could be
used as needed by the Supreme Court; thus, if the caseload would

110. I know my own experience sitting with the First Circuit Court of
Appeals by designation (and authoring eleven opinions for the Court) made
me an attractive candidate to the White House for the Court and assisted the
ABA evaluators in analyzing my qualifications.
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not justify their utilization, there would be no obligation to do so,
and in any event, no cost either way.
4. Increase the Court's Budget to Allow for "Elbow" Law
Clerks11 1 for All Superior Court Judges and Clerk Pools in the
Family and Worker's Compensation Courts.
If writing opinions is valued along with the thoroughness of
research (as I think it should be), then law clerks are essential.
Judges at all levels have simply too many pressing tasks to allow
for the kind of thoughtful, reflective analysis needed to regularly
write substantial opinions from scratch. We should encourage
more expository opinion writing by judges; to do this, judges need
elbow law clerks to assist them. Moreover, elbow law clerks serve
another critical function as sounding boards for judges. This too is
a critical need in a position where frequently there is no one to
bounce ideas off. I believe, based on my own experience, that a
judge's analytic process is enhanced by access to an elbow clerk,
who is generally a young attorney of great ability and enthusiasm
who can act as a judge's researcher, drafter, sounding board and
gut checker.
There is another critically important reason to consider this
suggestion. Law clerk positions allow for mentoring, which is
critical to building the bench for the long term. If we are going to
take seriously the idea of building a quality judiciary for the long
term, we must embrace mentoring as one of the most important
keys to success.
5.

Restore Term Limits to JNC Members.

In his paper, Mr. Marion describes the problem of JNC
members serving long past their appointed terms. 112 This process
could be fixed by a simple amendment to the statute that provides
that if a slot is not filled by the nominating authority, the
appointment reverts to a different default authority, such as the
Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court or the Governor.
The possibility of losing the right to choose a JNC member should
serve as sufficient incentive to eliminate this problem.

111. Elbow law clerks work in chambers, one-on-one with a specific judge,
not as part of a clerk pool.
112. Marion, supra note 19, at 745-46.
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6.

Repeal the "Look Back" Provision.

The five-year look back provision11 3 was viewed as a reform
needed to decrease repeat applications and the log jams associated
with them, and to increase the Governor's flexibility in selecting
nominees. The provision was well intentioned, but has had
several unintended consequences. One result has been a decrease
in the number of applicants for each new judicial position; another
is an increasingly large pool from which the Governor may
nominate. As the pool increases in size and the number of new
applicants decreases, the quality control effect of the JNC is
reduced as it pumps more and more aspirants into the pool.
7. Consider Restructuring the Appointing Authorities for JNC
Members.
The current system includes significant legislative control
The Commission I propose should
over JNC appointments.
consider proposals to restore this power to the Governor (with
possible Senate confirmation). Further, while I am not endorsing
this suggestion, another consideration is to include a Judicial
Officer (the Chief Justice or his/her designee) on the Commission.
The involvement of a Justice in the process could serve to better
inform the Commission regarding the qualifications of nominees
and requirements of the position. (The question of whether the
presence of the Chief Justice would cause attorney members to be
less frank however, must also be considered.)
8. Create an ABA-like Review Commission to Make
Recommendations to the JNC.
Above I describe the role of the ABA Standing Committee on
the federal judiciary in the federal court nomination and
confirmation process. I believe a similar process could and should
be created for state court judgeships. There are several ways this
could be accomplished. One possibility is to task the obligation to
the Rhode Island Bar Association, and particularly to the
bench/bar committee for the court in which the opening exists.
This may be problematic however because of the closeness of the
bar of each court. A second possibility is to create a standing
committee of eminent members of the bar much like the ABA
113.

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-6(a)(4) (to be repealed effective Jun. 30, 2010).

2010]

REFLECTIONS ON MERIT SELECTION

699

Standing Committee on the federal judiciary with a defined
geographic and practice-based diversity. Appointment could come
from either the bar or the Supreme Court. A third option would
be to give the task to the Judicial Tenure and Discipline
Commission, which is comprised of highly regarded judges and
attorneys. Whichever vehicle is chosen, one member could be
given the role of investigator and the full Commission could vote,
just as with the ABA Standing Committee. The model of the ABA
Standing Committee, and the procedures it utilizes, is well tested.
It could work for the Rhode Island judiciary just as it does (most of
the time) for the federal judiciary.
B. Other Reforms
As noted above, review of the applicant data for the past
fifteen years appears to indicate the number and quality of
applicants has declined. (I acknowledge that this is a purely
subjective observation, but I know it is shared by many observers.)
If both of these facts are true, however, it is a cause for concern,
and it should be the subject of investigation.
Whatever the cause, there may be things that the JNC could
do now to improve the applicant pool. These initiatives would not
require new legislation, but could be implemented immediately by
the Commission. There also may be initiatives that the JNC, the
bar, and Roger Williams University Law School could undertake
to invest for the future of the Judiciary. For what they are worth,
here are several suggestions:
1. Take the JNC Formal Process out to the Legal Community.
The JNC process is mysterious to many, even in the bar. The
current Chairman of the JNC, Dr. Herbert Brennan, has
suggested that the JNC engage the legal community by taking its
proceedings out of the Government office building, and into the
community. For example, meetings could be scheduled at Roger
Williams University School of Law, or at town halls around the
state. Taking the process to the public and to the bar will serve to
open up the process and de-mystify it.
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2. Engage the Bar in an Informational Meeting at the Annual
Bar Association Meeting.
Another suggestion of Dr. Brennan, and his predecessor,
Stephen Carlotti, is for the JNC to be part of a moderated session
at the annual Bar Association meeting to inform members
informally (and on their own "turf') about the JNC process and
what the individual members of the commission look for in
candidates. This session could include former members of the
commission as well as judges who have been through the process.
The above outlined suggestions for reform are intended to
spur discussion and debate. I am sure other, even better,
proposals are out there, and all ideas should be considered. A well
constituted Commission with appropriate resources and time
would be able to sort through the various suggestions and produce
a legislative proposal for the future of the courts which could
make Rhode Island a national model.
CONCLUSION
Fifteen years of judicial merit selection has helped to improve
the Rhode Island judiciary. There is much more that can be done,
especially if we are willing to embrace the challenge and think
creatively. This Symposium should be a starting point for, not an
end to, the discussion.

